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INTRODUCTION
On October 11, 2007, Dr. Maureen Jones arrived at the Paris Parker
Salon to receive a Swedish massage.1 Rather than leaving refreshed, Dr.
Jones left Paris Parker Salon with pain and discomfort in her lower back.2
By the following day, Dr. Jones’s pain had increased so significantly that
she sought immediate medical treatment.3 An MRI revealed that Dr. Jones
had suffered a ruptured disc in her lower back.4 After a failed attempt at
conservative treatment, she underwent surgery.5 Dr. Jones subsequently
filed suit against the salon, the masseuse, and the salon’s insurance
provider.6 At a bench trial, the court ruled in favor of Dr. Jones, finding
that the masseuse breached the applicable standard of care and awarding
Dr. Jones damages in excess of $800,000.7
Despite the considerable award of damages, Dr. Jones never received
a bill for what the health care provider charged.8 Dr. Jones testified that
the Baton Rouge Clinic did not charge her for the services she received
there as a professional courtesy.9 The Louisiana First Circuit Court of
Appeal ruled, however, that Louisiana’s collateral source rule applied to

1. Johnson v. Neill Corp., No. 2015 CA 0430, 2015 WL 9464625, at *1 (La.
Ct. App. 1st Cir. Dec. 23, 2015).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at *2.
9. Id. at *10.
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Dr. Jones’s “written-off”10 expenses, as well as actual paid expenses, and
that, therefore, she could recover the healthcare provider’s total amount
billed.11 Thus, Dr. Jones received $107,811 for medical expenses she never
incurred.12 However, if Dr. Jones had brought this cause of action after
January 1, 2020 and had received the write-off benefit through her
insurance carrier, then she would still recover $43,124.40 for medical
expenses she never incurred.13
The collateral source rule prevents third-party payments to or benefits
conferred on the victim from reducing the tortfeasor’s liability.14 The
jurisprudential test for the collateral source rule, prior to 2020, required
that (1) the application of the rule furthers the policy goal of tort deterrence
and that (2) the plaintiff must have experienced a diminution of
patrimony15 in obtaining the benefit.16 Following the Louisiana Supreme
Court’s decision in Bozeman v. State, Louisiana courts inconsistently
applied the collateral source rule.17 This inconsistency effectively allowed
certain plaintiffs to unjustly profit from litigation—plaintiffs like Dr.

10. A “write-off,” as referred to in this Comment, is the difference between
the amount billed by the health care provider and the amount paid by the health
insurer or other third party. Gary M. Langlois, Jr., Louisiana’s Collateral Source
Rule: Eliminating the “Windfall” Arising from Medical Expense Write-Offs, 63
LOY. L. REV. 291, 301 (2017). For example, the health care provider might bill the
patient $5,000 for services provided; however, the workers’ compensation fee
schedule only obliges the workers’ compensation insurer to pay $3,000. The
$2,000 difference between the amount billed and the actual amount paid by the
insurer is the written-off amount. The healthcare provider eats the written-off
amount is eaten because it legally cannot recover it from the patient.
11. The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal held that even though the
plaintiff did not suffer a diminution in patrimony to obtain the benefit, allowing
the recovery of the written-off amount would not be “unconscionable.” Johnson,
2015 WL 9464625, at *11.
12. Id.
13. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.27(B) (2020).
14. Bozeman v. State, 879 So. 2d 692, 697 (La. 2004).
15. Patrimony is defined as all of a person’s assets and liabilities that are
capable of having a pecuniary value. Patrimony, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(11th ed. 2019).
16. See Bozeman, 879 So. 2d 692.
17. See generally Lockett v. UV Ins. Risk Retention Grp., 180 So. 3d 557
(La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2015); Royer v. State Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 210 So. 3d
910 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2017).
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Jones, who had not incurred any monetary burdens from their injuries yet
received a profit.18
In the 2020 First Extraordinary Session, the Louisiana Legislature
enacted Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:2800.27, which governs the
collateral source rule’s application to medical expenses and provides much
needed clarity to the rule.19 The statute limits a plaintiff’s recovery to the
actual amounts paid, with an exception.20 The exception allows a court to
award 40% of the written-off amount when a person obtains a write-off
through an issuer of health insurance or Medicare.21 Although Louisiana
Revised Statutes § 9:2800.27 takes a step in the right direction, the statute
does not provide an equitable and just solution in all cases. An award for
written-off medical expenses is excess recovery and makes the plaintiff
“more than whole,” thereby contradicting the public policy behind
compensatory damages and tort recovery.22 On the other hand, denying
plaintiffs recovery in addition to the actual amounts paid, except for when
the write-off is obtained via health insurance or Medicare, can result in
some plaintiffs being made less than whole.23 For example, the new statute
fails to consider the diminution to patrimony suffered by plaintiffs that
procure the write-off benefit through either their attorney or selfnegotiations.24 An additional issue is that the statute mandates that the
18. See generally Lockett, 180 So. 3d 557 (allowing plaintiff to recover
written-off medical expenses that were never incurred); Royer, 210 So. 3d at 922
(allowing plaintiff to recover written-off amounts even though he suffered no
diminution in patrimony to obtain benefit because the “overriding policy of tort
deterrence outweighed the concern of double recovery”).
19. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.27 (2020).
20. See id. § 9:2800.27.
21. The statute provides:
The court shall award to the claimant forty percent of the
difference between the amount bill and the amount actually paid
to the contracted medical provider by a health insurance issuer
or Medicare in consideration of the claimant’s cost of
procurement, provided that this amount shall be reduced if the
defendant proves that the recovery of the cost of procurement
would make the award unreasonable.
Id. § 9:2800.27(B).
22. Langlois, supra note 10, at 315.
23. See id. § 9:2800.27(D).
24. See generally Johnson v. Neill Corp., No. 2015 CA 0430, 2015 WL
9464625, at *1 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. Dec. 23, 2015) (acknowledging that the
plaintiff received medical services for free as a professional courtesy); Hoffman
v. 21st Century N. Am. Ins., 209 So. 3d 702 (La. 2015) (acknowledging that the
plaintiff received a discounted rate on medical services because of an agreement
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court allow the jury to see only evidence of the amount billed by a medical
provider and not the amount actually paid, which could potentially lead to
inflated awards of general damages.25
The Louisiana Legislature should amend Louisiana Revised Statutes
§ 9:2800.27 to provide that recovery, in addition to amounts actually paid,
must be tied to the costs paid or incurred by the plaintiff in procuring the
write-off benefit.26 An amendment limiting recovery to actual amounts
paid, with an exception for cost of procurement,27 would provide an
equitable result to both plaintiffs and defendants.28 This proposed
exception would allow recovery in addition to the amounts actually paid
in cases where expenses diminish the victim’s patrimony in exchange for
obtaining the benefit of the write-off amount.29 Such an amendment would
permit recovery in amounts that make victims whole, and thus tortfeasors
would still satisfy their obligation under Louisiana Civil Code article
2315.30 The legislature should also amend the statute to ensure that with
respect to damages, litigants cannot present the jury with evidence other
between the healthcare provider and attorney); Lockett v. UV Risk Retention
Grp., Inc., 180 So. 3d 557 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2015) (allowing plaintiff to
recover written-off medical expenses obtained through self-negotiations).
25. See id. § 9:2800.27(F).
26. See generally Lockett, 180 So. 3d 557 (allowing plaintiff to recover
written-off medical expenses that were never incurred); Johnson, 2015 WL
9464625, at *1 (allowing plaintiff to recover expenses for medical services
rendered to the victim as a professional courtesy); Royer v. State Dep’t of Transp.
& Dev., 210 So. 3d 910 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2017) (allowing plaintiff to recover
written-off amounts even though he suffered no diminution in patrimony to obtain
benefit because the “overriding policy of tort deterrence outweighs the concern of
double recovery”).
27. This exception would utilize the definition of “cost of procurement”
provided in the current statute. “Cost of procurement” is defined as the cost paid
by or on behalf of the claimant to procure the benefit paid by a health insurance
issuer or Medicare and the cost of procurement of the award of medical expenses,
including but not limited to contracted attorney fees and health insurance
premiums paid. Id. § 9:2800.27(A)(5).
28. See generally TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 41.0105 (2019).
29. See Hoffman, 209 So. 3d 702 (noting that victim paid contingency fee to
attorney to obtain attorney-negotiated write-offs); see also O’Connor v.
Litchfield, 864 So. 2d 234 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2001) (noting that victim paid
monthly insurance premiums to obtain private insurer’s discounted rates for
medical services).
30. The Louisiana Supreme Court in Bellard v. American Century Insurance
held that Louisiana Civil Code article 2315 places an affirmative duty on the
tortfeasor to pay compensatory damages in the amount that makes the victim
whole. Bellard v. Am. Century Ins., 980 So. 2d 654, 668 (La. 2008).
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than the actual amounts paid to a medical provider for services. This
amendment would allow juries to have a more accurate valuation of the
damages at issue.
Part I of this Comment will discuss the history and development of the
collateral source rule in the United States.31 Additionally, this section will
outline Louisiana’s adoption and application of the collateral source rule
prior to the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in Bozeman v. State.32
Part II will begin with a discussion of the holding in Bozeman v. State and
its effect on the collateral source rule’s application.33 Further, this section
will consider how after Bozeman the Louisiana Supreme Court continued
to restrict the application of the collateral source rule, leading to the
enactment of Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:2800.27.34 Part III will
explain how this new statute runs contrary to the policy behind tort
recovery in general.35 Specifically, the section will show how the statute
allows courts in certain cases to award what are effectively punitive
damages, thereby exceeding the plain language of Louisiana Civil Code
article 2315.36 Additionally, the section will show how the law prevents
plaintiffs from being made whole in other cases.37 Part IV will conclude
by proposing that the Louisiana Legislature should amend Louisiana
Revised Statutes § 9.2800.27. The recommended amendment rids the
statute of the arbitrary provision allowing recovery of 40% of write-offs
in certain cases, and it ties additional recovery to a plaintiff’s cost of
procuring the write-off benefit.38 Further, this section will explain why
tying available damages, in addition to the actual amounts paid, to the
plaintiff’s cost of procurement will provide a more just and equitable
recovery scheme.

31. Propeller Monticello v. Mollison, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 152 (1854).
32. Bozeman v. State, 879 So. 2d 692 (La. 2004).
33. See id.
34. See Hoffman, 209 So. 3d 702; Simmons v. Cornerstone Invs., 282 So. 3d
199 (La. 2019).
35. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.27 (2020).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See id. § 9:2800.27(B).

348056-LSU_81-1_Text.indd 364

12/2/20 7:03 AM

2020]

COMMENT

361

I. LOUISIANA TORT RECOVERY & THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE
The collateral source rule plays a vital role in tort litigation because it
preserves the obligation of tortfeasors to repair the damages they cause.39
States’ application of the rule and the effects that the application has on
damages awards have diverged significantly since the U.S. Supreme
Court’s adoption of the rule in 1854.40 Some states have adopted statutes
governing the rule’s application, such as Louisiana, whereas others apply
the collateral source rule pursuant to jurisprudential tests.41
A. Tort Recovery in Louisiana and Its Connection with the Collateral
Source Rule
Louisiana Civil Code article 2315 provides the starting point for all
tort litigation within the state.42 The article states, “Every act whatever of
man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened
to repair it.”43 The obligation that article 2315 creates places an affirmative
duty on the tortfeasor to pay compensatory damages that “make the victim
whole.”44 The purpose of compensatory damages is to compensate a
victim for actual damages suffered, and when calculated, compensatory
damages should total the actual loss sustained.45 In rare cases, a court may
award punitive damages in addition to actual damages suffered.46 The aim
of punitive damages is to punish the wrongdoer.47 Although compensatory
damages are available in all tort actions, a court may only award punitive
39. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315 (2019) (“Every act whatever of man
that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair
it.”).
40. See Propeller Monticello v. Mollison, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 152 (1854).
41. See generally Bellard v. Am. Cent. Ins., 980 So. 2d 654 (La. 2008)
(holding the Bozeman two-pronged test determines whether the collateral source
rule applies to received benefits).
42. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315.
43. Id.
44. Bellard, 980 So. 2d at 668.
45. Damages, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Compensatory
damages represent the monetary value of harm that the victim suffers as a result
of the tortfeasor’s actions—for example, the amount of medical expenses incurred
by the victim or the pecuniary damages to the victim’s automobile in a car
accident. Id. These damages are in contrast to punitive damages, which are
awarded solely to punish the tortfeasor and not to make the victim whole. Id.
46. FRANK L. MARAIST & THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, JR., LOUISIANA TORT LAW
§ 7.03 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2013).
47. Damages, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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damages in “extremely specific and egregious situations” that are
identified by statute.48 Indeed, because of their nature, punitive damages
are available in only six situations according to the Louisiana Civil Code,
including driving while intoxicated, criminal sexual activity, and hazing.49
The Louisiana Supreme Court divides compensatory damages into
two categories: special damages and general damages.50 Special damages
must be specially pled or alleged and are those damages that courts can
determine with relative certainty.51 Examples of special damages include
lost wages, lost future earnings, and medical expenses.52 By contrast,
general damages are inherently speculative, and courts cannot determine
them with mathematical certainty.53 Examples of general damages include
pain and suffering, mental anguish, and loss of enjoyment of life.54 The
collateral source rule, however, applies only to special compensatory
damages.55
The collateral source rule prevents third-party payments to or benefits
conferred on the victim from reducing the tortfeasor’s liability.56 In other
words, courts will not deduct from the victim’s compensatory damages
payments received from a source other than the tortfeasor.57 The collateral
source rule can only apply to special damages because it requires that the
victim incur the expenses at some point, meaning the expenses are directly
quantifiable.58 The collateral source doctrine is both an evidentiary rule
and a principle of damages awards, working in both capacities to ensure a
just recovery for victims.59

48. Langlois, supra note 10, at 316.
49. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315.3 (2019) (permitting punitive damages in
child pornography cases); id. art. 2315.4 (permitting punitive damages when the
injury was caused by an intoxicated driver); id. art 2315.7 (permitting punitive
damages when the injury was caused by criminal sexual activity with a juvenile);
id. art. 2315.8 (permitting punitive damages in domestic abuse cases); id. art.
2315.9 (permitting punitive damages in terrorism cases); id. art. 2315.10
(permitting punitive damages when death is caused by hazing).
50. McGee v. A C & S, Inc., 933 So. 2d 770, 774 (La. 2006).
51. MARAIST & GALLIGAN, supra note 46, § 7.02.
52. Langlois, supra note 10, at 296–97.
53. MARAIST & GALLIGAN, supra note 46.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Bozeman v. State, 879 So. 2d 692, 697 (La. 2004).
57. Id. at 698.
58. 2 JACOB A. STEIN, STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES TREATISE §
13.4 (3d ed. 2016), Westlaw STEIN TREATISE.
59. Bozeman, 879 So. 2d at 697.
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B. The Collateral Source Rule in the United States
The collateral source rule finds its application in the laws of every
state.60 The United States Supreme Court adopted the general collateral
source doctrine in 1854, and state courts have since applied the collateral
source rule in various forms.61 Congress has enacted legislation governing
the application of the collateral source rule in narrow circumstances,
leaving much discretion to the states to determine their boundaries.62
Given this broad discretion, application of the collateral source rule varies
significantly among states.63
1. General Development of the Collateral Source Rule
The U.S. Supreme Court first introduced the collateral source rule in
its 1854 decision The Propeller Monticello v. Mollison.64 The case arose
when the plaintiff, Gilbert Mollison, filed a lawsuit for damages after his
ship sunk as a result of a collision with the defendant’s ship, the
Monticello.65 Although the Court found the pilot of the Monticello at fault
for causing the collision, the ship’s owner claimed that he was not liable
for payment of damages because Mollison had already received payment
from his own insurer.66 The Court rejected the defendant’s argument,
stating that an insurer does not act as a joint tortfeasor to release the atfault party from liability.67 Further, the Court reasoned that the contract
between Mollison and its insurer was a “wager between third parties” and
would have no effect on the tortfeasor’s liability.68 As a matter of principle,
the Court held that “[the tortfeasor] is bound to make satisfaction for injury
60. See generally Harmonie Group/Next Generation, 50 State Collateral
Source Rule Overview, LITIG. TOOLS, https://www.harmonie.org/file/Litigation%
20Best%20Practices/Collateral%20Source%20Rule%202016.pdf [https://perma.
cc/HMR5-M7KU] (last visited Sept. 25, 2019).
61. See Propeller Monticello v. Mollison, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 152 (1854).
62. See Bryce Benjet, A Review of State Law Modifying the Collateral Source
Rule: Seeking Greater Fairness in Economic Damages Awards, 76 DEF. COUNS.
J. 210 (2009). See, e.g., 6 U.S.C. § 442(c) (2018) (providing any recovery by a
plaintiff under this anti-terrorism federal cause of action shall be reduced by the
amount of collateral source compensation received).
63. See generally Harmonie Group/Next Generation, supra note 60.
64. See Propeller Monticello, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 152.
65. Id. at 153.
66. Id. at 155.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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done.”69 The Court’s holding became known as “the collateral source
rule.”70
Although there is jurisprudence from the Supreme Court regarding the
collateral source rule, Congress defers to the state legislatures for a formal
enactment of the rule.71 This lack of federal guidance has led to divergent
approaches among lower courts since the Propeller Monticello decision in
1854.72 The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that “[p]ayments
made to or benefits conferred on the injured party from other sources are
not credited against the tortfeasor’s liability, although they cover all or a
part of the harm for which the tortfeasor is liable.”73
2. Other States’ Applications of the Collateral Source Rule
Many states have derogated from the Restatement’s broad approach,
however, by enacting statutes that restrict the application of the collateral
source rule.74 These statutes range from abrogating the collateral source
rule entirely to leaving the rule untouched in its original form.75 The
current trend has been for state legislatures to enact statutory reform
retreating from the rule’s all-encompassing original form.76
Perhaps the most plaintiff-friendly application of the collateral source
rule is found in Hawaii.77 Hawaiian courts apply the collateral source rule
in its original form;78 courts refuse under all circumstances to subtract
from a plaintiff’s award benefits from a collateral source.79 Further,
Hawaiian courts state that it is better for the victim to receive a double
recovery than to allow the tortfeasor to benefit as a result of a reduction to
an award of damages.80 Additionally, the Hawaii Supreme Court has held
that the collateral source rule applies to both Medicare and Medicaid,
69. Id.
70. See id. at 152.
71. See Benjet, supra note 62. Congress has, however, enacted statutes
governing the application of the collateral source rule in narrow and specific
instances. See, e.g., 6 U.S.C. § 442(c) (2018) (providing any recovery by a
plaintiff under this anti-terrorism federal cause of action shall be reduced by the
amount of collateral source compensation received).
72. See generally Harmonie Group/Next Generation, supra note 60.
73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 920(A) (AM. L. INST. 1979).
74. Benjet, supra note 62, at 211.
75. See generally Harmonie Group/Next Generation, supra note 60.
76. Langlois, supra note 10, at 313.
77. Harmonie Group/Next Generation, supra note 60.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. (citing Bynum v. Magno, 101 P.3d 1149 (Haw. 2004)).
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prohibiting the reduction of a damages award to the discounted amount.81
Hawaii is one of only a handful of states that have yet to enact a statute
limiting the collateral source rule’s application.82
One example of state statutory guidance on the collateral source rule
is Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 41.0105.83 Although the
collateral source rule in Texas began as a jurisprudential doctrine that
precludes any reduction in a tortfeasor’s liability because of benefits from
an independent source, the Texas Legislature has codified application of
the rule with respect to damages awards.84 The statute provides that
“recovery of medical or health care expenses incurred is limited to the
amount actually paid or incurred by or on behalf of the claimant.”85 The
Texas Supreme Court interpreted the relevant statute in Haygood v.
DeEscabedo, holding that to impose liability for medical expenses that are
not charged does not prevent a windfall to a tortfeasor, but rather creates
one for a claimant.86 The Texas Supreme Court further explained that the
statute allows recovery of expenses that have been or will be paid and bars
recovery of amounts and charges that the service provider bills but then
writes off.87 Although this statute substantially limits the collateral source
rule’s application compared to states like Hawaii, the statute still allows
for victims under certain circumstances to recover benefits that they have
received from a collateral source.
Unlike Texas, Idaho has abrogated the collateral source rule entirely.88
In 1990 the Idaho Legislature enacted Idaho Code § 6-1606, which
requires the deduction of collateral source payments from damages
awards, thereby allowing the recovery of only the victim’s out-of-pocket
expenses.89 The statute limits the tortfeasor’s liability to damages
81. See Bynum v. Magno, 101 P.3d 1149 (Haw. 2004). This means the
plaintiff will be able to recover the full amount of medical expenses regardless of
what is actually paid.
82. See generally Harmonie Group/Next Generation, supra note 60. The
states that have not enacted a statute governing the collateral source rule are
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maine, Massachusetts, New Mexico, South Carolina, Vermont, Washington,
West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See Harmonie Group/Next Generation,
supra note 60.
83. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 41.0105 (2019).
84. Harmonie Group/Next Generation, supra note 60 (citing Haygood v.
DeEscabedo, 356 S.W.3d 390 (Tex. 2011)).
85. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 41.0105.
86. Haygood v. DeEscabedo, 356 S.W.3d 390, 395 (Tex. 2011).
87. Id. at 396–97.
88. Harmonie Group/Next Generation, supra note 60.
89. IDAHO CODE § 6-1606 (2019).
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remaining after all forms of collateral source payments are taken into
account.90 The purpose of the statute is to prevent victims from receiving
more than what is owed for their injuries.91 The court applies the relevant
reductions under the statute post-trial.92 Further, Idaho courts have ruled
that allowing the introduction of evidence of written-off expenses is
problematic because it allows the plaintiff to artificially inflate the
damages suffered and promotes a fiction as to the damages actually
incurred.93
Idaho is one of only two states to abrogate the rule in its entirety.94 The
current state of Louisiana’s collateral source rule is a statute enacted by
the Louisiana Legislature that falls somewhere between Hawaii’s allencompassing application and the Texas statute limiting recovery to the
actual amounts paid.95
C. The Collateral Source Rule in Louisiana
It was not until the Louisiana Supreme Court’s 1962 decision in
Gunter v. Lord that Louisiana courts adopted the collateral source rule.96
In Gunter, the court held that a tort victim could not recover twice from
the same insurer for the same medical expenses.97 The court established
that in cases where a source besides the wrongdoer wholly or partly
indemnifies the plaintiff, “the wrongdoer . . . would [not] benefit
therefrom by a reduction of his damages in a suit by the injured party.”98
Therefore, courts will not reduce a defendant’s liability because of benefits
that the plaintiff receives from the plaintiff’s own insurer.99 For 27 years
following Gunter, the Louisiana Legislature allowed courts to develop and
further entrench the collateral source rule’s applicability to the calculation
of awards of damages in tort actions.100
90. Harmonie Group/Next Generation, supra note 60.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 265 P.3d 502 (Idaho
2011).
94. See Harmonie Group/Next Generation, supra note 60 (listing New Jersey
as the only other state to abrogate the collateral source rule in its entirety).
95. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.27 (2020).
96. Gunter v. Lord, 140 So. 2d 11 (La. 1962).
97. Id. at 16.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See generally Norris v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 416 So. 2d 321 (La.
Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1982); Surgi v. Otis Elevator Co., 541 So. 2d 297 (La. Ct. App.
5th Cir. 1989).

348056-LSU_81-1_Text.indd 370

12/2/20 7:03 AM

2020]

COMMENT

367

In 1989, however, the Louisiana Legislature enacted Louisiana Code
of Evidence article 409.101 This article, known as the “collateral source
rule of evidence,” prevents tortfeasors from attempting to reduce their
liability by introducing evidence of third-party payments made to
victims.102 Until 2020, the Louisiana Legislature had not yet codified a
similar rule with respect to the calculation of awards of damages.103 The
passing of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 2020,104 however, aligned
Louisiana with the majority of states that have enacted statutes restricting
the extent of the collateral source rule’s application to awards of
damages.105 The difference between the evidentiary context and the
context of damages awards is that the former governs what is introduced
as evidence in litigation, whereas the latter governs the amount of special
damages available to the victim.106 Currently, Louisiana Revised Statutes
§ 9:2800.27 dictates courts’ application of the rule to special damages in
Louisiana.107
After the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in Gunter, the court
remained silent regarding the application of the collateral source rule to
calculations of damages awards until its decision in Louisiana Department
of Transportation & Development v. Kansas City Southern Railway in
2003.108 In Kansas City, the court found the defendant, Kansas City
Southern Railway (KCS), liable to the plaintiff, Louisiana Department of
Transportation and Development (DOTD), for pollution clean-up costs
under the Louisiana Environmental Quality Act.109 The court held that the
101. “In a civil case, evidence of furnishing or offering or promising to pay
expenses or losses occasioned by an injury to person or damage to property is not
admissible to prove liability for the injury or damage nor is it admissible to
mitigate, reduce, or avoid liability therefor. This Article does not require the
exclusion of such evidence when it is offered solely for another purpose, such as
to enforce a contract for payment.” LA. CODE EVID. art. 409 (2019).
102. Langlois, supra note 10, at 303. Defendants frequently would introduce
evidence of payments from third parties received by the victims in an attempt to
persuade the jury to award a lower damages award.
103. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.27 (2020).
104. See H.B. 57, 2020 Leg., 1st Extraordinary Sess. (La. 2020).
105. Langlois, supra note 10, at 303.
106. See LA. CODE EVID. art. 409; see also Langlois, supra note 10, at 305–09.
The focus of this Comment is on the collateral source rule’s application to
damages awards, and for that purpose, the following discussion will pertain to that
application alone.
107. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.27.
108. La. Dep’t of Transp. & Dev. v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 846 So. 2d 734
(La. 2003).
109. Id. at 736.
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collateral source rule applied to allow recovery of funds that the DOTD
received from a third party, and thus the amount DOTD had already
received did not reduce KCS’s liability.110
In Kansas City, DOTD sued KCS to recover clean-up costs, alleging
that KCS polluted a construction site for Interstate 49 in Shreveport,
Louisiana.111 Prior to the suit, the United States government reimbursed
DOTD for 90% of the cleanup costs.112 KCS argued, and the lower courts
held, that the reimbursement from the federal government limited KCS’s
liability to the remaining 10% of costs.113 The state supreme court
reversed, however, and applied the collateral source rule to prohibit the
reduction of the plaintiff’s award.114 The court reasoned that the possibility
of the plaintiff receiving a profit—an amount exceeding the actual
damages sustained—was preferable to allowing the defendant to reduce
its liability by 90%.115
The Louisiana Supreme Court’s opinion in Kansas City marked the
end of the court’s silence on the applicability of the collateral source
rule.116 Since its ruling in Kansas City, the court has issued multiple
opinions limiting the rule’s application, specifically in cases where writeoffs reduced the victim’s medical expenses.117 This recent jurisprudence,
however, has failed to create a bright-line rule for lower courts to follow
when determining whether the collateral source rule should apply in a
given situation.
II. BOZEMAN V. STATE: THE BEGINNING OF A RESTRICTIVE ERA
The Louisiana Supreme Court began a trend of restricting application
of the collateral source rule in 2004.118 In Bozeman v. State, the state
110. Id. at 745.
111. Id. at 736.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 743.
115. Id.
116. See Bozeman v. State, 879 So. 2d 692 (La. 2004); Hoffman v. 21st
Century N. Am. Ins., 209 So. 3d 702 (La. 2015); Simmons v. Cornerstone Invs.,
282 So. 3d 199 (La. 2019).
117. See Bozeman, 879 So. 2d 692 (holding the collateral source rule does not
apply to write-offs obtained through Medicaid); Hoffman, 209 So. 3d 702 (holding
the collateral source rule did not apply to attorney-negotiated write-offs for
medical expenses); Simmons, 282 So. 3d 199 (holding the collateral source rule
did not apply to medical write-offs obtained through the workers’ compensation
fee schedule).
118. See Bozeman, 879 So. 2d 692.
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supreme court held that the rule does not apply to written-off medical
expenses obtained through Medicaid.119 The court has since found the rule
inapplicable to written-off medical expenses obtained through attorney
negotiations120 and workers’ compensation.121 Ultimately, the Louisiana
Supreme Court’s restrictive trend led to the Louisiana Legislature enacting
a statute that governs the collateral source rule’s application.122
A. The Accident That Brought Change
In Bozeman v. State, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the
collateral source rule does not apply to Medicaid write-off amounts and
thus limited awards of special damages to the actual amounts paid.123 The
court reasoned that because the plaintiff obtained the write-off benefit
without paying consideration, the collateral source rule should not apply
to allow the plaintiff to recover damages in excess of what was actually
paid.124 Bozeman marked the court’s first consideration of whether the rule
applies to medical expenses that health care providers write off or
contractually adjust under the federal Medicaid program.125 When a
plaintiff is a Medicaid recipient, the law requires that the health care
provider accept as full payment an amount set by the Medicaid fee
schedule.126 This amount will always be lower than the amount charged by
the health care provider, thereby creating a write-off like the one under
dispute in Bozeman.127
On May 12, 1993, Terry Bozeman suffered brain damage and other
severe injuries as a result of a one-car accident.128 Immediately following
the accident, a helicopter transported Mr. Bozeman to the LSU Medical
Center in Shreveport, where he stayed for about a month until moving to
a long-term care facility to receive around-the-clock care.129 Mr. Bozeman
remained at the long-term care facility in a semi-conscious state until his
death on August 29, 1996.130 Prior to his death, Mr. Bozeman accrued
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
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$613,626.64 in medical expenses, of which Medicaid covered
$291,863.56.131 Following the accident but before his death, Mr.
Bozeman, with his wife Linda Bozeman as his signing representative,
applied for and received Medicaid benefits.132 Some 10 days following the
grant of Medicaid benefits, Mrs. Bozeman filed an action for personal
injuries against DOTD, alleging that her husband’s injuries were the result
of the unreasonably dangerous condition of Highway 173.133 At trial, both
parties introduced documents detailing the medical services provided to
Mr. Bozeman, along with the amounts that Medicaid paid for Mr.
Bozeman’s care.134 The State, arguing on behalf of DOTD, requested that
DOTD receive a credit for the amounts that Medicaid paid.135 The trial
court, however, denied this request and awarded the plaintiff damages,
including the full amount of medical expenses that Medicaid paid to Mr.
Bozeman’s health care providers.136
On appeal, the State argued that the trial court erred in its liability
determinations and damages awards.137 The State reasoned that the trial
court failed to deduct the amount that Medicaid paid from the total amount
awarded for medical expenses.138 The Second Circuit Court of Appeal
affirmed the lower court’s judgment in part but remanded the case for the
trial court to “fix the amount of special damages.”139 On remand, the trial
court substantially reduced the award of medical damages, holding that the
plaintiff cannot recover the written-off medical expenses.140 On a second
appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the trial court’s ruling for the
following reasons: (1) that there is no obligation to pay the write-off
amount; (2) that no windfall should accrue to either party when the
plaintiff cannot recover the write-off amount; and (3) that federal and state
Medicaid statutes require health care providers to accept the payment set
by the Medicaid fee schedule as payment in full.141 The court further
reasoned that the goal of tort recovery is to make the plaintiff whole, and
in the current case the plaintiff was made whole by recovering the amounts

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
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that Medicaid actually paid.142 Following the Second Circuit’s decision,
the Louisiana Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to address
whether the collateral source rule applies to written-off medical
expenses.143 The supreme court looked extensively into the collateral
source rule’s application throughout history and closely examined the
approaches taken by other states.144
B. The Bozeman Court’s Multi-Jurisdictional Analysis of the Collateral
Source Rule
In its Bozeman opinion, the Louisiana Supreme Court first noted the
inconsistent jurisprudence regarding the collateral source rule’s
application to Medicaid write-offs in both Louisiana and elsewhere.145 The
court recognized that there are three approaches that other states have
taken in determining whether the collateral source rule applies to writtenoff medical expenses.146 The three approaches taken are as follows: (1)
Reasonable Value of Services, (2) Actual Amounts Paid, and (3) Benefit
of the Bargain.147 The court provided a multi-jurisdictional analysis of
each approach, citing to decisions from other state supreme courts to
determine whether the collateral source rule should apply to the write-offs
that Mr. Bozeman obtained through Medicaid.148
1. Reasonable Value of Services
The first approach to the collateral source rule that the court
acknowledged was the approach known as “Reasonable Value of
Services.”149 This approach provides that the amount of a collateral-source
benefit received by the victim will not reduce the wrongdoer’s liability.150
Further, the court explained that under this approach, even if the benefit
conferred upon the plaintiff is a gift, the plaintiff should not receive a

142. Id.
143. Id. at 697.
144. Id. at 697–706.
145. Id. at 701.
146. Id. at 701–05.
147. Id. at 701.
148. Id. at 697–706.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 702 (quoting La. Dep’t of Transp. & Dev. v. Kansas City S. Ry.
Co., 846 So. 2d 734, 743 (La. 2003)).
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reduction in the award of special damages for the medical expenses
billed.151
The Bozeman court cited to the South Carolina Supreme Court’s
opinion in Haselden v. Davis to further explain the Reasonable Value of
Services approach.152 In Haselden, the court held that the plaintiff could
recover the full amount of billed medical expenses; it refused to limit his
award to what Medicaid actually paid.153 The parties debated whether they
could introduce into evidence either the total amount of medical expenses
or the amount that Medicaid paid.154 The trial court held in favor of the
plaintiff and allowed introduction of the full amount of medical
expenses.155 The appellate court affirmed the ruling.156
The South Carolina Supreme Court granted writs to determine
whether the collateral source rule should apply to write-offs obtained
through Medicaid.157 The court held that the collateral source rule does
apply and that the plaintiff’s recovery should not be limited to the amounts
that Medicaid paid.158 The court stated that the plaintiff in a personal injury
action can recover the reasonable value of the medical services, not
limiting recovery to the amount actually paid.159 Furthermore, the court
held that the Medicaid provider,160 which bills the total amount and then
agrees to accept a lower payment, may not claim that the reasonable value
of the services equals the lesser amount paid.161 The plaintiff in Bozeman
argued that the focus of the case should be on the reasonable value of the
medical services, not what was actually paid or incurred.162 The Louisiana
Supreme Court, however, rejected this approach, holding that it would be
unconscionable to allow the victim to receive free medical care and then
to “pocket the windfall” by recovering medical expenses that were never
incurred.163

151. Id. at 701–02.
152. Id. at 701; Haselden v. Davis, 579 S.E.2d 293 (S.C. 2003).
153. Haselden, 579 S.E.2d at 295.
154. Id. at 294.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 295.
160. A Medicaid provider is a physician who agrees to accept as compensation
for medical services those amounts set forth in the Medicaid agreement. Id.
161. Id.
162. Bozeman v. State, 879 So. 2d 692, 702 (La. 2004).
163. Id. at 705.
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2. Actual Amounts Paid
In Bozeman the Louisiana Supreme Court also discussed the approach
known as “Actual Amounts Paid,” which denies the plaintiff the ability to
recover the write-off amounts because the plaintiff does not incur those
amounts.164 This approach is the most restrictive application of the
collateral source rule short of complete abrogation.165 The defendant in
Bozeman urged the court to apply this approach and argued that the
written-off amounts are “illusory charges” and that allowing recovery of
them would violate the policy behind compensatory damages.166
The opinion Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions provides a good
example of the application of the Actual Amounts Paid approach to a
plaintiff’s damages award, but the Bozeman court did not cite to Howell.167
Not long after Bozeman, however, the Louisiana Supreme Court cited to
Howell in Hoffman v. 21st Century North America Insurance to explain
the Actual Amounts Paid approach.168 The Howell opinion provides a clear
demonstration of the Actual Amounts Paid approach as applied to a
plaintiff’s award of damages.169 In Howell, the court limited recovery to
the amount that plaintiffs and their insurers have actually paid or still owe
for past medical expenses.170 The case arose out of an automobile accident
in which the defendant conceded fault.171 The only contested issues at trial
were the amount of the plaintiff’s economic and noneconomic damages
and whether the collateral source rule should apply to the written-off
medical expenses that the plaintiff sought to recover.172 If the court were
to apply the rule, then the plaintiff would have recovered the total amount
billed by the medical provider, whereas not applying the rule would limit
the plaintiff’s recovery to amounts actually paid by the plaintiff or her
insurer.173
The Howell court reasoned that the collateral source rule did not apply
to the written-off amounts because they were “not a benefit provided to

164.
165.
166.
167.
2011).
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
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the plaintiff in compensation for his or her injuries.”174 Further, the court
acknowledged that limiting the plaintiff’s recovery to paid charges
provides certainty without violating the policy underlying the collateral
source rule.175 According to the court, this approach did not lessen tort
deterrence and instead allowed the plaintiff to still receive full
compensation.176 The court reasoned, however, that it would be unfair to
allow a decrease to the tortfeasor’s liability because of the foresight of the
victim in some cases but to not decrease liability in other cases.177
3. Benefit of the Bargain
The approach known as “Benefit of the Bargain” awards the plaintiff
the full value of the medical expenses, including the write-off amount,
when the plaintiff has paid some consideration for the benefit of the writeoff amounts.178 Under this approach, because of the plaintiff’s continuous
diminution in patrimony through the payment of insurance premiums,
courts do not consider write-offs a windfall.179 On the other hand, when a
plaintiff has obtained the benefit without a diminution to his patrimony,
the approach prevents the recovery of written-off amounts.180
In Bozeman the Louisiana Supreme Court used the Virginia Supreme
Court’s ruling in Acuar v. Letourneau as an example of the Benefit of the
Bargain approach.181 In Acuar, the court held that the collateral source rule
applied to written-off medical expenses obtained through a contractual
arrangement with a health insurance carrier.182 The plaintiff sought
damages resulting from an automobile accident and received a favorable
jury verdict at trial.183 The jury, however, reduced the award by the amount
of the written-off medical expenses.184 On appeal, the plaintiff argued that
the trial court erred by allowing the submission of evidence of the writeoffs to the jury.185
174. Id. at 1145.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Bozeman v. State, 879 So. 2d 692, 703 (La. 2004).
178. Id.
179. Id. (citing Griffin v. La. Sheriff’s Auto Risk Assoc., 802 So. 2d 691, 714
(La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2001)).
180. Id. at 705.
181. Id. at 704.
182. Acuar v. Letourneau, 531 S.E.2d 316, 322 (Va. 2000).
183. Id. at 317.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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The Virginia Supreme Court determined that the rule applied to the
write-offs obtained through the plaintiff’s insurance carrier because the
wrongdoer should not receive a benefit from a contract for which he never
paid compensation.186 Furthermore, the court held that to the extent that
such a result provides a windfall to the injured party, the victim rather than
the wrongdoer should receive that benefit.187 The Louisiana Supreme
Court ultimately adopted this approach.188
C. The Result from Bozeman: A Two-Pronged Inquiry
The Bozeman court held that the Benefit of the Bargain approach was
the proper application of the collateral source rule and that where there is
a diminution of patrimony in obtaining the write-off benefit, recovery of
that benefit is proper.189 Thus, under this approach, Medicaid recipients
cannot recover as damages the amounts written off under the fee
schedule.190 In denying application of the collateral source rule, the court
determined that the plaintiff could only recover the amounts that Medicaid
actually paid.191
Louisiana courts interpret the Bozeman decision as creating a twopronged inquiry for the application of the collateral source rule.192 The
two-pronged test inquires into: (1) whether application of the rule will
further the policy goal of tort deterrence, and (2) whether the victim, in
obtaining the available collateral source, either paid for such benefit or
suffered some diminution of patrimony because of the availability of the
benefit such that no double recovery would result from the rule’s
application.193 The Benefit of the Bargain approach allows more recovery
than the Actual Amounts Paid approach under certain facts and less
recovery than the Reasonable Value of Services approach.194 The
Louisiana Supreme Court failed, however, to specify whether the two-

186. Id. at 323.
187. Id.
188. Bozeman v. State, 879 So. 2d 692, 704 (La. 2004).
189. Id. at 705.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See Bellard v. Am. Cent. Ins., 980 So. 2d 654, 669–70 (La. 2008) (citing
Bozeman, 879 So. 2d 692); Lockett v. UV Ins. Risk Retention Grp., 180 So. 3d
557 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2015); Royer v. State Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 210 So.
3d 910 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2017).
193. Bellard, 980 So. 2d at 669.
194. Bozeman, 879 So. 2d at 701–05.
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pronged test requires the facts to satisfy both prongs or one, and thus left
ample room for interpretation of its application.195
D. You Get What You Pay For
The Louisiana Supreme Court has continued to restrict the application
of the collateral source rule since its 2004 decision in Bozeman.196 The
court, as recently as May 2019, held that when obtaining a collateral
source does not diminish a plaintiff’s patrimony, the collateral source rule
does not apply.197 These subsequent decisions increased discussion and
debate surrounding the collateral source rule, which ultimately resulted in
the Louisiana Legislature’s enactment of Louisiana Revised Statutes §
9:2800.27 during the 2020 First Extraordinary Session.198
1. Attorney-Negotiated Write-offs: Not a Mode of Excessive Recovery
The restriction of the collateral source rule’s application came to the
forefront of the Louisiana legal field when the Louisiana Supreme Court
addressed attorney-negotiated write-offs in Hoffman v. 21st Century North
American Insurance.199 The Hoffman case arose out of a vehicular
accident in which the defendant, Carolyn Elzy, rear-ended the plaintiff,
Eddie Hoffman.200 At a bench trial, the judge found the defendant
completely at fault and awarded Hoffman special damages.201 When
calculating the amount for special damages, the court reduced the award
based on a medical statement indicating that an attorney-negotiated writeoff reduced the charges and that the plaintiff’s attorney had an arrangement
with the plaintiff’s medical provider.202 Hoffman argued that under the
collateral source rule, he should recover the total billed amount, including

195. See id. at 705.
196. See Bellard, 980 So. 2d 654 (holding the collateral source rule does not
apply to funds received from a workers’ compensation insurer); Hoffman v. 21st
Cent. N. Am. Ins., 209 So. 3d 702 (La. 2015) (holding the collateral source rule
does not apply to write-offs obtained through attorney-negotiations); Simmons v.
Cornerstone Invs., 282 So. 3d 199 (La. 2019) (holding the collateral source rule
does not apply to write-offs obtained through workers’ compensation insurance).
197. See Simmons, 282 So. 3d 199.
198. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.27 (2020).
199. Hoffman, 209 So. 3d 702.
200. Id. at 703.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 704.
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the write-offs.203 The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the
trial court’s decision to deny recovery of the write-offs.204
The Louisiana Supreme Court, applying the Bozeman two-pronged
inquiry, held that the collateral source rule does not apply to attorneynegotiated write-offs.205 The particular write-off at issue failed the second
prong of the inquiry because the court held that the payment of attorney
fees by the plaintiff to obtain the write-off was not a sufficient diminution
of patrimony.206 The court found that allowing the plaintiff to recover any
amount in excess of the actual amount paid would result in a profit for the
plaintiff.207 In addressing the purpose of tort recovery, the court stated that
allowing the plaintiff to recover expenses he had not actually incurred “is
contrary to Louisiana Civil Code art. 2315.”208 Post-Hoffman, the supreme
court continued to limit the applicability of the collateral source rule, as
seen most recently in Simmons v. Cornerstone Investments, with respect
to write-offs obtained through workers’ compensation benefits.209
2. The Advantage of the Collateral Source Rule and Workers’
Compensation
The Louisiana Supreme Court held in Simmons v. Cornerstone
Investments that the collateral source rule does not apply to medical writeoffs obtained through the workers’ compensation fee schedule.210 The
Simmons case arose when the plaintiff, Kerry Simmons, suffered a
workplace injury in the course and scope of his employment with Cintas
Corporation.211 The plaintiff received workers’ compensation benefits
through his employer, totaling $18,435 in coverage for medical bills,
which had been reduced from $24,435 pursuant to the Louisiana Workers’
Compensation Act Medical Reimbursement Schedule.212 Kerry Simmons
filed suit against both Cornerstone Investments, LLC, the owner of the
building where she was injured, and its insurer.213

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
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The plaintiff settled with his employer, leaving Cornerstone and its
insurer as the sole defendants in the suit.214 The defendants moved to
exclude evidence of the amount of written-off expenses and to include
only the amount actually paid by the workers’ compensation insurer.215
The trial court granted the defendants’ motion, thereby preventing the
introduction of evidence showing any amount in excess of what workers’
compensation actually paid.216 The Louisiana Third Circuit Court of
Appeal denied the plaintiff’s writ application; however, the Louisiana
Supreme Court granted writ to determine the applicability of the collateral
source rule to workers’ compensation payments.217
The state supreme court found that the written-off amount is a
“phantom charge” that the plaintiff had not paid nor would ever have to
pay.218 The workers’ compensation payment schedule provides the
maximum monetary amounts that will be paid by workers’ compensation
insurers.219 Payments by employees in excess of the workers’
compensation payment schedule are forbidden by law.220 The court held
that the collateral source rule does not apply to write-offs obtained through
the workers’ compensation payment schedule.221 In making its
determination, the court applied the Bozeman two-pronged test to find the
collateral source rule inapplicable.222 The court held that awarding medical
expenses that were never incurred based on the public policy of tort
deterrence is insufficient to justify application of the rule.223 Furthermore,
the court held that the loss of the employee’s right to file a tort suit against
the employer was an indirect diminution of patrimony, insufficient to
satisfy the second prong of the Bozeman test.224 The court stated that any
recovery in excess of the reduced amount of medical bills “would be a
windfall to [the] [p]laintiff” and would thereby contradict the rationale
behind the collateral source rule.225 The Louisiana Supreme Court’s

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
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decision in Simmons, however, is not the most recent development of the
collateral source rule in the state.226
E. Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:2800.27: A Step in the Right Direction
The combination of overwhelming Republican success in the 2019
state legislature elections and the second highest insurance rates in the
country made 2020 a prime year for long-sought tort reform in
Louisiana.227 After dozens of tort reform bills failed to gain bipartisan
support, the Civil Justice Reform Act of 2020 passed in both chambers
during the final days of the 2020 First Extraordinary Session.228 This tort
reform bill, among other significant changes to the Louisiana civil justice
system,229 enacted Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:2800.27, which governs
the application of the collateral source rule to medical expenses.230 The
statute follows the Actual Amounts Paid approach from Bozeman, with
one exception.231
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:2800.27, titled “Recoverable past
medical expenses; collateral sources; limitations; evidence,” begins by
defining terms and phrases unique to the statute.232 These terms and
phrases include “health insurance issuer,”233 “medical provider,”234 “cost

226. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.27 (2020).
227. Telephone Interview with John M. Stefanski, State Representative
District 42, Louisiana House of Representatives (July 10, 2020).
228. See H.B. 57, 2020 Leg., 1st Extraordinary Sess. (La. 2020).
229. The other significant changes made in the bill are: (1) lowering the jury
trial threshold from $50,000 to $10,000; (2) amending Louisiana Code of
Evidence article 411, which governs the admissibility of liability insurance; and
(3) repealing the law preventing evidence of whether the plaintiff was wearing a
seatbelt from being offered to the jury. Id § 9:2800.27.
230. H.B. 57, § 4, 2020 Leg., 1st Extraordinary Sess. (La. 2020).
231. See id. § 9:2800.27.
232. Id. § 9:2800.27(A).
233. “‘Health insurance issuer’ means any health insurance coverage through
a policy or certificate of insurance subject to regulation of insurance under state
law, a health maintenance organization, an employer-sponsored health plan, the
Office of Group Benefits, or an equivalent federal or state health plan.” Id. §
9:2800.27(A)(1).
234. “‘Medical provider’ means any healthcare provider, hospital, ambulance
service, or their heirs or assignees.” Id. § 9:2800.27(A)(2).
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sharing,”235 “contracted medical provider,”236 and “cost of
procurement.”237 The statute applies prospectively beginning January 1,
2021, and will not apply to causes of action arising or actions pending prior
to January 1, 2021.238
The Louisiana Legislature codified two major Louisiana Supreme
Court decisions with Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:2800.27.239
Subsection C, codifying Bozeman, limits a claimant’s recovery to the
actual amounts paid when the medical expenses are covered by
Medicaid.240 Additionally, subsection E, codifying Simmons, limits a
claimant’s recovery of medical expenses to the amount paid under the
medical payment fee schedule of the Louisiana workers’ compensation
law when the expenses are paid pursuant to that law.241 Subsection D of
the statute provides a catch-all for the recovery of any past medical
expenses not paid by an insurance provider, Medicare, Medicaid, or a
workers’ compensation insurer.242 The statute only allows recovery in
addition to the actual amounts paid when a person obtains the write-off
benefit via an insurance provider or Medicare.243
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:2800.27(B) requires a court to award
to the claimant 40% of the written-off amount when a health insurance
issuer or Medicare paid for the expenses.244 However, the subsection does
provide that the court can reduce the 40% if the defendant proves that the
additional recovery is unreasonable.245 The defendant has the opportunity

235. “‘Cost sharing’ means copayments, coinsurance, deductibles, and any
other amounts which have been paid or are owed by the claimant to a medical
provider.” Id. § 9:2800.27(A)(3).
236. “‘Contracted medical provider’ means any in-network medical provider
that has entered into a contract or agreement directly with a health insurance issuer
or with a health insurance issuer through a network of providers for the provision
of covered healthcare services at a pre-negotiated rate or any medical provider
that has billed and received payment for covered healthcare services from
Medicare when the provider is a participating provider in those programs.” Id. §
9:2800.27(A)(4).
237. See supra note 27 defining “cost of procurement.”
238. H.B. 57 § 6, 2020 Leg., 1st Extraordinary Sess. (La. 2020).
239. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.27(C), (E).
240. Id. § 9:2800.27(C).
241. Id. § 9:2800.27(E).
242. Id. § 9:2800.27(D).
243. Id. § 9:2800.27(B).
244. Id.
245. Id.
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to present evidence regarding the reasonableness of the additional
damages after a jury renders a verdict.246
Lastly, subsection F provides the procedure for the courts’ application
of the statute.247 In all cases, the statute requires the court to inform the
jury only of the amount billed by a medical provider and not the amount
actually paid.248 Additionally, the statute forbids disclosing to the jury
whether any person, health insurance issuer, or Medicare has paid or
agreed to pay any of the claimant’s medical expenses.249 After the jury
renders a verdict, the court receives evidence related to the limitations of
recoverable medical expenses provided in the statute.250 The court then
reduces the jury award according to the evidence presented.251
Post-Bozeman, the Louisiana Supreme Court continuously decreased
the extent of the collateral source rule’s application to written-off medical
expenses.252 The Louisiana Legislature finally brought much needed
clarity to the rule’s application in 2020 by enacting Louisiana Revised
Statutes § 9:2800.27.253 The statute, however, does not provide an
equitable and just solution in all cases. An award for written-off medical
expenses is excess recovery and makes the plaintiff more than whole,
thereby contradicting the policy behind compensatory damages and tort
recovery.254 On the other hand, denying plaintiffs’ recovery beyond the
actual amounts paid, except for when the write-off comes from health
insurance or Medicare, can result in awards that make plaintiffs less than
whole.255

246. Id. § 9:2800.27(F).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. See Bellard v. Am. Cent. Ins., 980 So. 2d 654 (La. 2008) (holding the
collateral source rule does not apply to funds received from a workers’
compensation insurer); Hoffman v. 21st Century N. Am. Ins., 209 So. 3d 702 (La.
2015) (holding the collateral source rule does not apply to write-offs obtained
through attorney-negotiations); Simmons v. Cornerstone Invs., 282 So. 3d 199
(La. 2019) (holding the collateral source rule does not apply to write-offs obtained
through workers’ compensation insurance).
253. See id. § 9:2800.27.
254. Langlois, supra note 10, at 315.
255. See id. § 9:2800.27(D).
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III. ONE STEP FORWARD AND A HALF STEP BACK
The application of Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:2800.27 as it is
written can provide inequitable results for both plaintiffs and
defendants.256 Depending on the amount of damages at issue in a case, the
application of the statute’s 40% provision could either impose punitive
damages on a defendant or fail to make the plaintiff whole.257 Additionally,
the statute fails to consider the diminution of patrimony suffered by a
plaintiff who obtains the write-off benefit through either an attorney or
self-negotiations.258 Lastly, requiring the court to inform the jury only of
the amount billed by a medical provider, and not the actual amount paid,
potentially inflates the general damages awarded in jury trials where the
collateral source rule applies.
A. An Unpleasant Statute for Both Parties
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:2800.27(B) allowing recovery of 40%
of the written-off medical expenses is a result of compromise in the
Louisiana Legislature.259 The 40% additional recovery that is available
when either a health insurance provider or Medicare reduces medical
expenses is meant to compensate for the plaintiff’s cost of procuring the
benefit of insurance.260 However, in certain cases, namely, those with
higher special damages, recovering 40% of the written-off expenses will
enable recovery that exceeds the plaintiff’s cost of procurement, thereby
contravening what the legislature intended with Louisiana Civil Code

256. Id. § 9:2800.27.
257. See id. § 9:2800.27(B).
258. See generally Johnson v. Neill Corp., No. 2015 CA 0430, 2015 WL
9464625, at *1 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. Dec. 23, 2015) (acknowledging that the
plaintiff received medical services for free as a professional courtesy); Hoffman
v. 21st Century N. Am. Ins., 209 So. 3d 702 (La. 2015) (acknowledging that the
plaintiff received a discounted rate on medical services because of an agreement
between the healthcare provider and attorney); Lockett v. UV Risk Retention
Grp., Inc., 180 So. 3d 557 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2015) (allowing plaintiff to
recover written-off medical expenses obtained through self-negotiations).
259. Telephone Interview with John M. Stefanski, State Representative
District 42, Louisiana House of Representatives (July 10, 2020). Representative
Stefanski, the author of the statute, explained that he originally had 30% in the
bill, and the opposition to the statute wanted 50%. Id. After extensive negotiations
on the content of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 2020, the Republicans and
Democrats settled on 40%. Id.
260. Id.
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article 2315: to make the victim whole.261 On the other hand, in cases with
lower special damages, the additional 40% recovery may be inadequate to
compensate the plaintiff for their cost of procurement.262
Once damages reach the point at which the plaintiff is made whole,
that is, when recovery equals the cost of procurement of insurance, any
additional liability effectively operates as punitive damages.263 According
to the Louisiana Civil Code, courts may award punitive damages only
when a code article specifically allows them to do so.264 Currently, there
are only six situations where punitive damages are available, including
cases involving egregious acts such as terrorism, criminal sexual activity
with a juvenile, and hazing that leads to death.265
The prerequisite to punitive damages that the defendant must exhibit
“wanton or reckless disregard” is further proof that Louisiana law means
to exclude the vast majority of negligence cases from implicating punitive
damages.266 The recovery of written-off medical expenses in excess of the
cost of procurement, in cases like Lockett v. UV Insurance Risk Retention
Group, where the victim sued for damages sustained in an automobile
accident, unjustifiably imposes punitive damages on defendants who
collided with another vehicle.267 The new statute allowing this excessive
recovery through the application of the collateral source rule effectively
imposes the same additional damages on negligent drivers that are only
statutorily permitted for egregious defendants such as terrorists and child
rapists.268
Conversely, when the amount of written-off medical expenses is low,
the additional 40% recovery provided by the statute may be inadequate to
261. Langlois, supra note 10, at 300.
262. Id.
263. MARAIST & GALLIGAN, supra note 46.
264. Id.
265. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315.3 (2019) (permitting punitive damages in
child pornography cases); id. art. 2315.4 (permitting punitive damages when the
injury was caused by an intoxicated driver); id. art. 2315.7 (permitting punitive
damages when the injury was caused by criminal sexual activity with a juvenile);
id. art. 2315.8 (permitting punitive damages in domestic abuse cases); id. art.
2315.9 (permitting punitive damages in terrorism cases); id. art. 2315.10
(permitting punitive damages when death is caused by hazing).
266. MARAIST & GALLIGAN, supra note 46, at § 7.03.
267. See generally Lockett, 180 So. 3d 557.
268. See, e.g., Hoffman v. 21st Century N. Am. Ins., 209 So. 3d 702 (La. 2015)
(bringing action for negligence arising out of an automobile accident). Cf. LA.
CIV. CODE art. 2315.7 (permitting punitive damages when the injury was caused
by criminal sexual activity with a juvenile); id. art. 2315.9 (permitting punitive
damages in terrorism cases).
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accomplish the goal of compensatory damages, namely, making the
plaintiff whole.269 Consider a case where there are $5,000 in written-off
medical expenses, and the plaintiff pays $6,000 per year for health
insurance. Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:2800.27(B) allows this plaintiff
to recover $2,000 in addition to the actual amounts paid “in consideration
of the claimant’s cost of procurement.”270 The additional recovery in this
hypothetical, however, only covers one-third of the plaintiff’s cost of
procurement. Under these facts, the statute fails to make the plaintiff whole
because the plaintiff takes either a $3,000 loss on the write-off or a $4,000
loss on the cost of procurement. Moreover, the issues with the additional
recovery allowed in Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:2800.27(B) are not the
only problems with the statute.271
B. Phantom Charges, Real Money
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:2800.27 provides that “[t]he jury shall
be informed only of the amount billed by a medical provider for medical
treatment.”272 This requirement will cause issues with the award of general
damages in cases where there are written-off medical expenses.273 There
is no mechanical rule for determining general damages; the facts and
circumstances of each case control.274 One of the considerations relevant
to calculating general damages is the amount of special damages
recoverable in the case.275 The difference between the amount of medical
expenses actually paid and the amount billed in cases can be hundreds of
269. Langlois, supra note 10, at 300.
270. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.27(B) (2020).
271. Id.
272. Id. § 9:2800.27(F) (emphasis added).
273. See, e.g., Johnson v. Neill Corp., No. 2015 CA 0430, 2015 WL 9464625,
at *1 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. Dec. 23, 2015) (awarding $700,000 in general damages
in combination with $135, 361 in special damages); cf. Hoffman, 209 So. 3d at
703 (awarding $4,500 in general damages in combination with $2,478 in special
damages).
274. Leblanc v. Allstate Ins. Co., 772 So. 2d 400, 405 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2000).
275. A popular method of calculating general damages awards is the
“multiplier method.” The multiplier method calculates all the plaintiff’s monetary
losses stemming from their injury, or special damages, and multiplies them by a
certain rate to get a desired total for general damages. For example, if a plaintiff
has $1,000 in special damages, the method will multiply $1,000 by multiplier to
get a total for general damages. How is Pain and Suffering Calculated in Lawsuits
in Louisiana?, SPENCER CALAHAN INJURY LAWS., https://www.calahanlaw.com/
personal-injury-lawyer-baton-rouge/how-is-pain-and-suffering-calculated-in-law
suits-in-louisiana/ [https://perma.cc/P2YT-CV3A] (last visited Aug. 31, 2020).
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thousands of dollars.276 Therefore, presenting the jury with the amount
billed and not the actual amount paid creates a false narrative regarding
the amount of special damages recoverable in the case. This false narrative
concocted by the presentation of evidence of the amount billed, and not
the amount actually paid, is likely to cause juries to inflate general
damages to match the high-dollar amount of the bill.
Consider this issue in the context of Bozeman v. State.277 In that case,
subsection F would require the jury to learn of the $613,626.64 in billed
medical expenses.278 The amount actually paid in Bozeman, however, was
$291,863.56.279 Under the new statute, the jury would only see evidence
of medical expenses that are more than double the actual amount paid.
This could easily lead to a jury overvaluing the general damages in a case
based on the false narrative created by billed medical expenses.
With a few exceptions for egregious cases, an alleged tortfeasor, if
found at fault, should be liable to a plaintiff only for the damages resulting
from the tortfeasor’s actions.280 These damages should not include writtenoff medical expenses in excess of the cost of procurement of insurance,
that the victim has no obligation to pay to the healthcare provider.281 On
the other hand, plaintiffs not at fault should always recover the amount of
compensatory damages that makes them whole.282 Additionally, the
plaintiff should not be allowed to present the amount billed by the
healthcare provider because it creates a false narrative that leads to inflated
awards of general damages. The Louisiana Legislature should amend
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:2800.27 to provide a more equitable
application of the collateral source rule for both plaintiffs and defendants.
IV. A FEW CHANGES TO MAKE EVERYONE HAPPY
Although the Louisiana Legislature’s enactment of Louisiana Revised
Statutes § 9:2800.27 provides much needed clarity to the collateral source

276. See generally Simmons v. Cornerstone Invs., 282 So. 3d 199 (La. 2019)
($128,615 in written-off medical expenses); Bozeman v. State, 879 So. 2d 692
(La. 2004) ($258,419.67 in written-off medical expenses): Johnson, 2015 WL
9464625, at *1 ($107,811 in written-off medical expenses).
277. See Bozeman, 879 So. 2d 692.
278. Id. at 694.
279. Id.
280. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315 (2019).
281. Simmons, 282 So. 3d at 204.
282. See discussion supra Part I.A on the purpose of compensatory damages
awards.
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rule’s application, it does not provide optimal results in many cases.283 The
Louisiana Legislature should amend the statute governing how the
collateral source rule applies to the calculation of awards for damages so
as to provide equitable recovery in all cases. Amending three sections of
the current statute will produce a fairer collateral source rule for both
plaintiffs and defendants alike.284
The legislature should amend § 9:2800.27(B) by tying any additional
recovery to the claimant’s cost of procurement.285 Additionally, the
legislature should remove subsection D from the statute and amend
subsection B to encompass all third parties not otherwise provided for in
the statute.286 Lastly, the legislature should amend § 9:2800.27(F) to
require that the actual amount of medical expenses paid be disclosed to the
jury.287 These amendments will collectively provide a collateral source
rule that is more equitable for both plaintiffs and defendants.
A. Fixing a Bad Compromise
The legislature should make two amendments to the statute’s
exception in subsection B.288 First, the Louisiana Legislature should
amend that subsection with respect to the potential recovery in addition to
the actual amounts paid.289 Additionally, the legislature should amend the
subsection to cover all third parties not otherwise provided for in the
statute in tandem with the deletion of subsection D.
Currently, Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:2800.27(B) reads, “The
court shall award to the claimant forty percent of the difference between
the amount billed and the amount actually paid to the contracted medical
provider . . . .”290 The legislature should amend the subsection to state:
“The court shall award to the claimant the lesser of the written-off amount
or the cost of procurement.”291 This amendment would provide an
equitable recovery in all cases where the collateral source rule applies.292

283. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.27 (2020).
284. See id.
285. See id. § 9:2800.27(B).
286. See id. § 9:2800.27(D).
287. See id. § 9:2800.27(F).
288. See id. § 9:2800.27(B).
289. See id.
290. Id. (emphasis added).
291. Id.
292. See discussion supra Part III.A regarding the equity issues with applying
the current 40% rule.
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The amendment allows for the recovery of either the plaintiff’s cost of
procurement or the written-off amount, whichever is lesser. The plaintiff
would be required to provide evidence regarding the cost of procurement.
This amendment places the statute somewhere between the Actual
Amounts Paid and Benefit of the Bargain approaches discussed in
Bozeman.293 The statute, with the proposed amendment, prevents the
double recovery allowed in states like Hawaii294 without following Idaho’s
harsh abrogation of the collateral source rule.295 Thus, the proposed statute
falls within the plain meaning and legislative intent behind Louisiana Civil
Code article 2315, and ensures that the plaintiff recovers damages that
make the plaintiff whole.296
Additionally, the legislature should amend subsection B to include all
third parties not otherwise provided for in the statute in tandem with
deleting subsection D from the statute.297 Currently, the exception to
limiting recovery to actual amounts paid only includes Medicare and
health insurance issuers.298 The legislature should change “health
insurance issuer or Medicare” to “third party not otherwise provided for in
this section.”299 This amendment would allow the statute to capture both
attorney-negotiated write-offs300 and self-negotiated write-offs,301 in
addition to those benefits obtained via health-insurance issuers and
Medicare.302 These amendments, however, do not solve all the issues with
§ 9:2800.27.

293. See Bozeman v. State, 879 So. 2d 692, 702–05 (La. 2004).
294. See Bynum v. Magno, 101 P.3d 1149 (Haw. 2004) (holding that it is
better for the victim to receive double recovery than to allow the tortfeasor benefit
from the collateral source).
295. See IDAHO CODE § 6-1606 (2019) (“[A] judgment may be entered for
the claimant only for damages which exceed amounts received by the claimant
from collateral sources as compensation for the personal injury or property
damage . . . .”).
296. See discussion supra Part I.A regarding tort recovery in general.
297. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.27(C), (E) (2020).
298. See id. § 9:2800.27(B).
299. Id.
300. See Hoffman v. 21st Century N. Am. Ins., 209 So. 3d 702 (La 2015).
301. See Lockett v. UV Ins. Risk Retention Grp., 180 So. 3d 557 (La. Ct. App.
5th Cir. 2015).
302. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.27(B).

348056-LSU_81-1_Text.indd 391

12/2/20 7:03 AM

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

388

[Vol. 81

B. A Change to Deflate Jury Verdicts
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:2800.27(F) provides the procedure for
courts applying the collateral source rule to an award of damages.303
Currently, the subsection provides:
In a jury trial, only after a jury verdict is rendered may the court
receive evidence related to the limitations of recoverable past
medical expenses provided by Subsection B or D of this section.
The jury shall be informed only of the amount billed by a medical
provider for medical treatment. Whether any person, health
insurance issuer, or Medicare has paid or agreed to pay, in whole
or in part, any of a claimant’s medical expenses, shall not be
disclosed to the jury. In trial to the court alone, the court may
consider such evidence.304
The legislature should amend the statute by deleting the first sentence
above and adding a sentence following the original second sentence to
allow the court to add damages post-verdict. Additionally, the second
sentence should be amended to require the court to present the jury with
only evidence of the actual amount paid for medical treatment. In tandem,
these amendments create a procedure for the court to add damages
pursuant to subsection B, discussed above, post-verdict.305 Subsection F
with the suggested amendments would read:
The jury shall be informed only of the amount paid by a third party
for medical treatment. In a jury trial, only after a jury verdict is
rendered may the court provide additional recovery to the jury
award pursuant to Subsection B of this Section. Whether any
person, health insurance issuer, or Medicare has paid or agreed to
pay, in whole or in part, any of a claimant’s medical expenses,
shall not be disclosed to the jury. In trial to the court alone, the
court may consider such evidence.306

303.
304.
305.
306.

348056-LSU_81-1_Text.indd 392

Id. § 9:2800.27(F).
Id.
See id. § 9:2800.27(B).
Id. (emphasis added to show proposed amendments).

12/2/20 7:03 AM

2020]

COMMENT

389

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1814 allows this postverdict additur307 by the court.308 Additionally, these amendments to
subsection F solve the issues discussed above with the potential for
inflated damage awards. The jury receiving evidence only of the medical
expenses paid provides a more accurate valuation of general damages and
prevents excessive recovery from defendants based on past medical
expenses that were never incurred.309 Lastly, the proposed amendments do
not require an alteration of Louisiana Code of Evidence article 409
because evidence of third-party payments remains inadmissible.310 The
amendment to subsection F alters only the amount of medical expenses
presented to the jury at trial and does not permit the evidence of who paid
the expenses that is forbidden by article 409.
C. Application of the Proposed Statute
The proposed amendment to Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9.2800.27
provides a more equitable and just recovery than the current statute, as
illustrated by three different hypotheticals. The application of the
collateral source rule with respect to write-offs is dynamic, as write-offs
arise from a variety of sources, including private insurance,311 attorneynegotiations,312 and self-negotiations.313 The following hypotheticals
further prove that although enacting Louisiana Revised Statutes §
9.2800.27 is a step in the right direction, the statute does not provide the
most equitable application of the collateral source rule.
1. Private Insurance Benefits
The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal in Griffin v. Louisiana
Sheriff’s Auto Risk Ass’n held that the collateral source rule applies to
307. “Additur” is defined as a trial court’s order, issued usually with the
defendant’s consent, that increases the jury’s award of damages to avoid a new
trial on grounds of inadequate damages. The term may also refer to the increase
itself, the procedure, or the court’s power to make the order. Additur, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
308. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1814 (2020).
309. See supra note 276.
310. LA. CODE EVID. art. 409 (2019).
311. See generally Griffin v. La. Sheriff’s Auto Risk Ass’n, 802 So. 2d 691
(La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2001).
312. See generally Hoffman, v. 21st Century N. Am. Ins., 209 So. 3d 702 (La.
2015).
313. See generally Lockett v. UV Ins. Risk Retention Grp., 180 So. 3d 557
(La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2015).
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write-offs obtained through a private insurer.314 Griffin filed a personalinjury lawsuit against the Terrebone Parish Sheriff’s Office after suffering
injuries from an automobile collision with a sheriff’s deputy.315 The court
held that Griffin’s premium payments continually diminished her
patrimony, and thus the collateral source rule applied to the reductions of
her medical expenses obtained via her insurer.316 The application of the
collateral source rule in this case allowed Griffin to recover an additional
$47,739.28 for the written-off medical expenses.317 Under the current
statute, Griffin could recover 40% of that amount, or $19,095.71.
Under the above proposed amendment, to determine the issue of the
write-offs, the court would compare Griffin’s additional recovery to the
amount by which obtaining the insurance benefit diminished her
patrimony.318 The initial step requires Griffin to provide evidence of the
cost of procuring the insurance benefit.319 Here, this requirement is easily
met by offering evidence of the payment of insurance premiums. The
opinion is silent regarding the premiums that Griffin paid for her
insurance; however, this hypothetical will assume she pays $5,000 per
year.320 Therefore, the statute would allow Ms. Griffin to recover the lesser
of either the $5,000 annual insurance premium or the written-off amount
of $47,739.28.
In this hypothetical, the statutory amendment would decrease the
plaintiff’s recovery from $19,095.71 to $5,000, but the decreased recovery
would still make the plaintiff whole.321 The victim would recover the
money paid to obtain the write-off benefit without charging the defendant
over $14,000 more than the expenses actually incurred by the plaintiff.322
This reduction provides an equitable recovery by not allowing the
tortfeasor to benefit excessively from the collateral source rule and by
allowing the plaintiff to recover the consideration paid to obtain the
insurance benefit.323

314. See Griffin, 802 So. 2d 691.
315. Id. at 695.
316. Id. at 715.
317. Id.
318. See supra Part IV.A.
319. See supra Part IV.A.
320. See generally Griffin, 802 So. 2d 691.
321. See discussion supra Part I.A on policy behind compensatory damages.
322. See Griffin, 802 So. 2d at 713 (stating the medical expenses paid by the
insurer equaled $42,169.72, with $47,739.28 written-off).
323. See discussion supra Part IV.A regarding the statute’s compromise
between abrogating and preserving collateral source rule.
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2. Attorney-Negotiated Write-Offs
In Hoffman, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could
not recover the written-off amount of medical expenses that he obtained
through attorney negotiations.324 The decision to not apply the collateral
source rule to attorney-negotiated write-offs reduced the plaintiff’s
recovery by $2,050.325 Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:2800.27(D) codifies
the Hoffman holding; therefore, the recovery would be the same under the
new statute.326 The above proposed amendment would allow the additional
recovery of $2,050 if the plaintiff could provide evidence of the cost of
procuring the write-off benefit.327 The plaintiff would likely be successful
in providing the necessary evidence via the contract signed by the
parties.328 Although the opinion is silent regarding the contingency fee
charged by the plaintiff’s attorney, this example will assume the fee was
33.3%.329
The proposed statutory amendment provides greater recovery in this
case compared to what the Louisiana Supreme Court awarded in Hoffman
and what Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:2800.27 allows.330 The
amendment would allow recovery of the written-off $2,050 or the amount
of the contingency fee paid by the plaintiff, whichever is lesser.331 Here,
the assumed contingency fee paid by the plaintiff would be $2,263.73.332
Thus, the amendment would allow the recovery of the written-off amount
because it is the lesser of the two potentially recoverable amounts.333 This
additional recovery makes the plaintiff whole because he is able to recover

324. See supra Part II.D.1.
325. Hoffman v. 21st Century N. Am. Ins., 209 So. 3d 702, 704 (La. 2015)
(finding plaintiff could only recover the $950 actually charged for medical
services and not the $3,000 billed).
326. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.27(D) (2020).
327. See supra Part IV.A.
328. See supra Part III.B.
329. “In routine personal injury cases, a typical contingency fee is 33.3 % of the
recovery.” The Attorney’s Fee: Contingency Fee, COCHRAN FIRM METAIRIE, http://
www.medicalmalpracticelouisiana.com/do-i-have-a-case/attorneys-fee-contingen
cy-fee [https://perma.cc/E7G5-8J2H] (last visited Mar. 25, 2020).
330. See supra Part IV.A.
331. See supra Part IV.A.
332. The contingency fee is calculated by multiplying the assumed 33.3%
contingency fee by the total damages award in the amount of $6,798. Hoffman v.
21st Century N. Am. Ins., 209 So. 3d 702, 703 (La. 2015).
333. See supra Part IV.A.
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the full amount of write-offs that he obtained through a diminution of
patrimony.334
3. Self-Negotiated Write-Offs
In Lockett, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal held that the
collateral source rule applies to self-negotiated write-offs of medical
expenses.335 In that case the application of the collateral source rule to the
written-off medical expenses increased the plaintiff’s recovery by
$41,360.04.336 The plaintiff obtained the write-off by personally
negotiating with Ochsner for a significant reduction in her medical bills in
exchange for immediate payment.337 Under Louisiana Revised Statutes §
9:2800.27(D), however, the plaintiff cannot recover the written-off
amount.338
Providing evidence of the cost of procurement under the proposed
amendment would be a difficult task.339 The plaintiff could offer evidence
of the time she spent negotiating with the health care provider and argue
that the lost time was a diminution to her patrimony. If the court were to
accept this evidence as sufficient proof of a diminution, then the question
becomes how the court will calculate the monetary value of lost time. The
legislature could decide on a set amount for self-negotiated deals, or the
plaintiff could provide evidence of the value of her time. This example
will use the value of her time as compared to the written-off amount. The
plaintiff in Lockett worked as a nurse, and thus her hourly wage would
determine the value of her time. Assuming that the plaintiff had an hourly
wage of $30 and that she spent 20 hours negotiating, the diminution to her
patrimony would be $600. Thus, the plaintiff would be allowed to recover
$600 in addition to the incurred medical expenses. This reduced recovery
would still meet the goal of making the plaintiff whole because she could
recover the incurred medical expenses as well as the diminution in
patrimony sustained spending time negotiating with the health care
provider.
The three scenarios above show the proposed amendment’s
effectiveness in satisfying the ultimate goal of tort recovery: to make the

334. See supra Part IV.A.
335. See Lockett v. UV Ins. Risk Retention Grp., 180 So. 3d 557 (La. Ct. App.
5th Cir. 2015).
336. Id. at 568.
337. Id. at 569.
338. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.27(D) (2020).
339. See supra Part IV.A.
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plaintiff whole.340 The proposed amendment provides an effective solution
that fits in between the original all-encompassing application of the
collateral source rule341 and the complete abrogation of the rule.342
Furthermore, the proposed amendment provides a more equitable solution
to both plaintiffs and defendants than does Louisiana Revised Statutes §
9:2800.27.343
CONCLUSION
The enactment of Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:2800.27 provided
much needed clarity to the collateral source rule’s application.344 The
statute, however, does not provide an optimal application of the collateral
source rule.345 Specifically, the statute’s exception to the Actual Amounts
Paid approach imposes punitive damages on the defendant in some cases
and fails to make the plaintiff whole in others.346 These punitive damages
make the plaintiff more than whole and thereby contradict the public
policy behind compensatory damages and tort recovery as a whole.347
Additionally, only presenting evidence of the amounts billed to the jury
can potentially cause inflated awards of general damages. The Louisiana
Legislature should amend the statute’s exception to the Actual Amounts
Paid approach, as well as the procedure for applying the rule to a jury
verdict. The current state of the collateral source rule provides inequitable
relief to both plaintiffs and defendants alike. An amendment to allow
recovery, beyond the actual amounts paid, in the amount of either the
write-off or the cost of procurement, would provide a more equitable result
to all parties. Additionally, amending the procedure to present evidence of
the actual amounts paid to the jury will provide more accurate monetary
awards of general damages. In the end, the amendments will provide a
fairer and more equitable collateral source rule to both sides.

340. See discussion supra Part I.A. on tort recovery in general.
341. See discussion supra Part I.B.2 on Hawaii’s application of the collateral
source rule.
342. See discussion supra Part I.B.2 regarding Idaho’s application of the
collateral source rule.
343. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.27.
344. Id.
345. See supra note 45.
346. See discussion supra Part III on recovery issues with statute’s 40% rule.
347. Langlois, supra note 10, at 315.
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